The Future of Democracy After Russia’s Invasion-3
By Lucan Alumad Way
Professor of political science at the University of Toronto. He is coauthor (with Steven Levitsky) of Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Authoritarian Durability (forthcoming).
Beyond unifying democratic forces, the Russian invasion also has the potential to weaken the “authoritarian international”—a term coined by the late Belarusian scholar Vitali Silitski to describe the loose alliance and coordination among diverse autocracies to combat democratic threats. Such coordination and cooperation have included the sharing of legal tools to stamp out civil society, diplomatic support, military assistance, and privileged access to Russian energy supplies.
In January 2022, for example, Putin’s government sent troops into Kazakhstan to support President Jomart Tokayev in the face of mass unrest. The central hub of this authoritarian international is the alliance between Xi Jinping and Putin, who famously declared “no limits” to their friendship at the February 2022 Beijing Olympics. The informal alliance also includes autocrats in smaller nondemocracies such as Belarus, Burma, Hungary, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Serbia.
Thus far, Russia’s authoritarian allies have mostly backed Putin. As of mid-March, there were few open signs of division between Xi and Putin. Burma expressed support for the invasion and Serbian president Aleksandar Vuèiæ has resisted sanctioning Russia, in large part because of Putin’s overwhelming popularity among Serbians. Orbán has also firmly resisted entreaties to supply lethal weapons to Ukraine or allow weapons to pass through Hungary.
Nevertheless, there are signs that the authoritarian coalition is fraying. The invasion has put Orbán in a particularly difficult situation given Hungary’s dependence on EU financial assistance and the country’s own experience of Soviet invasion in 1956. Orbán was forced to do a “180-degree turn” on several key issues. He condemned the invasion and refrained from vetoing EU sanctions against Russia—thus preserving European unanimity on the question.
He also reversed his recent hardline border policies, accepting about a hundred-thousand Ukrainian refugees in the week after the invasion. In addition, Burma, Hungary, and Serbia all voted for the March 2 UN resolution demanding an end to the Russian invasion. Despite Putin’s military backing of the Kazakh president just weeks before the Russian invasion, Tokayev has so far refused to openly support Russia’s action, abstaining from the vote. Overall, the UN condemnation was supported by 140 countries, with just five states—Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Russia, and Syria—voting against it and 34 abstaining.
The biggest question remains the degree to which China continues to back Russia. There are few signs at this point that China has backed away from the alliance, but one must wonder how much it will be willing to sacrifice in support of Russia, whose economy totals a mere US$1.5 trillion, against the United States, Canada, and EU, whose combined economies total more than US$35 trillion.
Indeed, China in the first weeks after the invasion refrained from giving Russia full-throated support. It abstained from the UN vote condemning Russia rather than opposing the resolution, and refused, in line with Western sanctions, to supply Russian airlines with spare parts. On March 11, Chinese premier Li Keqiang called the situation in Ukraine “disconcerting” and supported ceasefire talks. A lot hinges on the outcome of the debate apparently going on within the Chinese elite about its commitment to the Russian alliance.
The invasion is likely to discourage others from following in Putin’s footsteps. Russia’s difficulties and the international reaction have probably made it less likely that China will attempt to absorb Taiwan anytime soon. Rather than auguring a new era of authoritarian military expansion, the invasion is likely to put autocratic governments on the defensive.
Finally, the war will almost certainly weaken Russia’s geopolitical power. Russia’s heavy military losses and its unexpected difficulty advancing across Ukrainian territory have significantly damaged the reputation of the Russian armed forces. Even in the event of a Russian military victory, Russia is likely to be bogged down in an endless guerrilla struggle made more difficult by intense Ukrainian resistance, Western support from allied countries on Ukraine’s western border, and the sheer size of the country.
Furthermore, European measures to reduce dependence on Russian energy will undercut a key source of Russian influence in the region. In the space of a week, the invasion has turned Russia into a pariah state and strengthened the West. As David Von Drehle has argued, “Nothing makes friends for the U.S.A. like the rumbling of Russian tanks.”
The war is also likely to isolate Putin within Russia itself. Putin’s control over the media and increasingly harsh treatment of any form of dissent have limited the spread of negative information about the war. If the sanctions are successfully blamed on Western aggression, they may even bolster Putin’s popularity or at least have their negative political impact blunted for a time.
But several factors will make it harder for the government to control public opinion. First, the fact that many Russians have relatives in Ukraine gives them direct sources of information about the war outside the control of government censors. Second, the heavy concentration of Western journalists in Ukraine means that information about the war will be incredibly easy to find in even the most cursory online searches.
Russia has been a far more open society than China. It will be difficult for Putin to completely suppress information about the progress of the war. Third and most significantly, the government will not be able to cover up the deaths of Russian soldiers indefinitely. Such casualties will almost certainly undercut support for the war. An economic crisis and the weakening of Russia’s geopolitical power will undermine two of the most important sources of Putin’s popularity over the last twenty years.
What does all this mean for the future of democracy?
After more than a decade of democratic malaise, the invasion has both weakened Russia’s global status and produced an unprecedented degree of unity in the liberal world, driven by both moral outrage and existential security threats. But what does all this mean for the future of democracy?
Security threats and moral indignation did not enhance democracy after 9/11. In addition, during the Cold War, Soviet security threats often undermined democratic development by encouraging support for anticommunist dictators in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. It is also worth emphasizing that the conflict is still very young.
The military trajectory of the war could easily shift in Russia’s favor. Furthermore, the dual strains of the mass influx of Ukrainian refugees and European economic pain created by sanctions could test Western unity and create a future wellspring of populism.
Yet there are several reasons to think that the new context will strengthen democracy in Europe and perhaps elsewhere. First, the Cold War motivated investment in transnational liberal institutions such as the European Union, which in turn became a driver for the spread of democracy to Spain and Greece. The current conflict is similarly likely to encourage increased commitment to the European project.
Furthermore, in contrast to 9/11, the invasion has drawn sharp battle lines between authoritarian Russia on one side and a community of democratic states supporting Ukraine’s imperiled democracy on the other. The conflict may make it harder for European leaders to tolerate Orbán and other autocrats in the European Union.
Russia’s invasion has not only heightened awareness of the dangers generated by nationalism and illiberalism, but it has also linked them to a broader existential threat posed by Russian autocracy to European security. This threat is unlikely to diminish anytime soon. The heightened stakes will make it more costly for politicians such as Trump or Orbán to condemn blithely the international liberal order.
More than sixty years after the horrors of World War II inspired the creation of the European Union, the invasion has again reminded the world of the brutal human cost brought about by the rejection of liberal values. Democracy is not simply an abstract good but has important implications for human welfare. While greater pluralism may not generate greater economic growth or reduce levels of corruption, it does allow societies to avoid the kind of brutal violence we see today in Ukraine and, to an increasing extent, in Russia.
The conflict may also facilitate liberal development by fragmenting the authoritarian international and drastically undermining the attractiveness of the Russian path. Even if Russia ekes out a military victory in Ukraine, the country is likely to have far fewer resources to project its influence abroad.
Putinism will not be seen as a viable model for either building a prosperous society or generating stable autocracy. No matter what the future holds, this unjust and unprovoked invasion has been catastrophic for Ukraine and its people. Still, there remains a chance that the global liberal project may emerge from this darkness stronger and more invigorated than before.
Courtesy: Journal of Democracy
